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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-3589 
___________ 
 
DERRICK L. BROWN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PRESIDENT AMERICAN FEDERATION GOVERNMENT  
EMPLOYEES, AFGE Local 148 (union); WARDEN LEWISBURG USP 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 14-cv-01287) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard P. Conaboy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 23, 2015 
 
Before:  RENDELL, CHAGARES and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  May 7, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 In July 2014, Derrick Lakeith Brown, a federal inmate housed in Pennsylvania, 
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  In the petition, Brown 
alleged that he had been sexually assaulted by prison staff and denied medical care in 
connection with the assault.  Brown further alleged that prison staff had attempted to 
cover up the incident, and claimed that their actions violated his rights under the Eighth, 
First, and Fifth Amendments, the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, and other Bureau 
of Prisons (“BOP”) regulations.  The District Court screened Brown’s petition pursuant 
to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Habeas Cases and determined that, because Brown 
was challenging the conditions of his confinement rather than the validity, duration, or 
execution of his conviction and sentence, his claims were not within the scope of 
habeas corpus.  Therefore, the District Court summarily dismissed Brown’s petition 
without prejudice to his right to bring his claims in a civil rights action.1  Brown now 
appeals from the District Court’s order.  
  We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our 
review of the District Court’s dismissal of Brown’s § 2241 petition is plenary.  See 
Cradle v. U.S. ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam).    
 We agree with the District Court that Brown’s claims were not properly brought 
under § 2241.  As the District Court correctly explained, § 2241 “confers habeas 
                                              
1 Brown filed a § 2241 petition in June 2014 containing similar allegations concerning a 
separate incident.  The District Court summarily dismissed that petition as well.  See 
Brown v. Thomas, No. 14-cv-1093 (Order entered Jul. 2, 2014).   
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jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner who is challenging . . .  the execution 
of his sentence.”  Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005).  
While we have noted that “the precise meaning of ‘execution of the sentence’ is hazy,” 
we have made clear that a challenge under § 2241 must be to the manner in which the 
sentence is being “put into effect” or “carr[ied] out.”  Id. at 242-43; see also Cardona v. 
Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining that, in order for a prisoner to 
challenge the execution of his sentence under § 2241, he must allege that the “BOP’s 
conduct was somehow inconsistent with a command or recommendation in the 
sentencing judgment”).  Brown’s allegations of sexual assault and complaints about the 
prison’s response thereto concern the conditions of his confinement, not the manner in 
which his sentence is being carried out.  See Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen the challenge is to a condition of confinement such that a finding in 
plaintiff’s favor would not alter his sentence or undo his conviction, an action under        
§ 1983 [and not habeas corpus] is appropriate.”).  Therefore, the District Court properly 
determined that Brown’s claims are not cognizable under § 2241, and properly dismissed 
the petition.     
 Because this appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm 
the District Court’s order.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
